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Network industries face non-trivial investment chal-
lenges, due to lumpiness and sunkness of capacity
additions. These factors make investments particu-
larly risky, something that has become more obvious
in recent years, as former monopoly markets have
been opened to competition. This opening has gone
along with two main regulatory changes affecting
investments. First, public ownership and rate-of-re-
turn regulation have been replaced by private own-
ership and incentive regulation. Second, the focus of
regulation has moved from end-user services to
wholesale access of new competitors to the bottle-
neck infrastructure (essential facilities) of the incum-
bents. This regulatory restructuring has added com-
petitive and regulatory risks to the demand and cost
risks that already existed under monopolies. In the
US the dominant view until well into the 1980s was
that the prevailing rate-of-return regulation led to
excessive investments and too high prices. Its re-
placement by incentive regulation and competition
was seen as a correction towards more efficient
prices, costs and investments. More recently, howev-
er, incentive regulation has been accused of leading
to too little investment from a welfare perspective.
A careful reading of the theoretical literature on the
relationship between regulation and investment
shows that both under rate-of-return regulation and
under incentive regulation the investment effects
depend heavily on the way each type of regulation is
handled in practice.1 Quite generally,tight regulation
that runs a substantial risk of failing to cover the
firm’s costs will lead to suboptimal investment levels,
usually below those realized by unconstrained mo-
nopolists. Excessive investments under rate-of-re-
turn regulation only occur for rates of return above
the cost of capital and below the unconstrained
monopoly return. Softening incentive regulation at
some point leads to investments above the uncon-
strained monopoly levels, but it usually stays below
the welfare optimum (which may therefore not be
reachable in practice). Early empirical work on the
relationship between telecommunications infra-
structure investment and rate-of-return vs. incentive
regulation found investments under incentive re-
gulation to be higher (Greenstein, McMaster and
Spiller 1995; Ai and Sappington 2002). Newer work
on telecommunications mostly shows investments to
be negatively influenced by regulation, but Cambini
and Rondi (2010) estimate that in European gas and
electricity markets incentive regulation leads to
higher investment than rate-of-return regulation.
By enabling competitor access to bottleneck facilities
of incumbents, wholesale access regulation increases
the feasibility of competition that makes end-user
regulation superfluous. The network investments
affected by regulated access prices can concern bot-
tlenecks or complementary infrastructure down-
stream or upstream of the bottleneck. In both cases
the investor can either be the regulated incumbent or
unregulated competitors. The term “bottleneck” is
used in the sense of an essential facility, which is a
necessary input (fixed proportions) that is owned by
an incumbent and cannot be duplicated economically
by potential entrants (natural monopoly property).
Examples of such bottlenecks include electricity
transmission and distribution networks that are nec-
essary for competing electricity generators to reach
potential customers. They also include local loops in
fixed telephone networks that local and long-distance
carriers need in order to originate and terminate calls.
To the extent that competition-enhancing access reg-
ulation is successful it may increase investment by
alternative competitors at the expense of the incum-
bent. Total investment may thereby diminish or
increase depending on which effect is larger.
* Boston University and CESifo.
1 See Vogelsang (2010) for a short literature review.A more exten-
sive literature review is provided by Cambini and Jiang (2009).Effects of regulation on investment developed in
the literature
The concern of the literature on the relationship
between wholesale access regulation and bottleneck
investment is predominantly with access prices
based on “Long-Run Average Incremental Cost”
(LRAIC).2 Opponents of LRAIC argue that access
prices (and prices for unbundled network elements)
that do not cover all costs of investment would stifle
investments. Proponents of the LRAIC approach
argue that by definition this cost concept includes all
costs of expansion investments in new infrastructure.
Thus, any shortfall in (expected) coverage of invest-
ment costs would have to come from cost measure-
ment errors or mistakes in the underlying models.
Potential errors particularly concern modeling of the
cost of capital with sunk costs and uncertainty.Thus,
the claim that access regulation leads to lower bot-
tleneck investments is again based on the way the
regulation is handled.
A second large part of the access-related literature
addresses the incentive effects of wholesale access
obligations and their prices on competitors’ invest-
ments. It specifically centers on the stepping-stone or
ladder-of-investment hypothesis (described and justi-
fied in Cave 2006), which claims that entry by alter-
native providers in a market dominated by an incum-
bent is hindered by the necessity to acquire assets
with a range of bottleneck properties.As time goes by,
as entrants learn and as they grow in size (thereby
availing themselves of economies of scale), they can
climb an investment ladder with increasing bottle-
neck properties. In anticipation of that development
the regulator should, according to this approach, be-
gin by forcing the incumbent to make all bottleneck
inputs available at attractive prices thereby enabling
entry. However, the regulator should, in addition,
commit to reducing the attractiveness of regulated ac-
cess over time, beginning with inputs with fewer bot-
tleneck properties. This is meant to increase incen-
tives for alternative providers to actually invest in
assets with increasing bottleneck properties because
regulated access becomes less and less attractive.
The ladder-of-investment hypothesis has been em-
braced by European telecommunications regulators
but has been criticized in the literature.Bourreau and
Dog ˘an (2006) point out that with increasing availabil-
ity of alternative or bypass infrastructure the incum-
bent would voluntarily provide bottleneck access at
attractive terms for the alternative competitors,there-
by retarding bypass. Thus, instead of increasing regu-
lated access prices as bypass becomes more and more
available, the regulator should prohibit unbundled
access,once bypass becomes economical because oth-
erwise bypass would come too late.However,a major
problem with both the ladder-of-investment approach
and the Bourreau and Dog ˘an suggestion is that the
regulator will generally not know, when and where
bypass is sufficiently feasible.
The ladder-of-investment approach assumes that
bypass investments use the legacy technology of the
incumbent.In reality,however,bypass usually occurs
through a new technology or improvement of anoth-
er technology that is different from the legacy infra-
structure of the incumbent. Examples of the former
could be fiber access close to the home,through which
the bypass opportunities may deteriorate. An exam-
ple of the latter is a cable TV network that competes
with the telephone/DSL network of the incumbent
and of entrants using the incumbent’s technology.The
ladder-of-investment approach does not work here
because (a) the entrants cannot effectively duplicate
the incumbent’s local loops and (b) the cable TV
company investments may be jeopardized by any
boost given to the incumbent by selling access to the
entrants (Pindyck 2007).
Overall, the working of the ladder-of-investment
approach appears to be strongly depending on the
circumstances of the industry as well as on the way it
is implemented by the regulator.
In contrast to the ladder-of-investment hypothesis our
interest is in investment by both incumbent and en-
trants. Thus, access prices as a single instrument have
to fulfill two objectives. To the extent that the two
objectives do not run parallel,compromises have to be
reached.3 In particular, initially low access charges for
access to strong bottlenecks may prevent investments
by the incumbent because those bottlenecks usually
are particularly sunk. Accordingly, for such sunk bot-
tleneck access the risk of bypass would justify initial
surcharges on conventional LRAIC calculations but
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2 LRAIC are usually measured in analytical cost models and are
therefore independent of the firm’s actual costs.While in addition
price caps,yardstick regulation and the efficient component pricing
rule (ECPR) have been used or suggested for bottleneck pricing,
there appears to be little specific literature linking them to bottle-
neck investment.
3 In practice, investment is often pursued by regulators as a sepa-
rate objective with separate instruments. For more on such “repair
models”, see Vogelsang (2010).CESifo DICE Report 3/2010 15
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these would no longer be feasible,once bypass occurs,
thus leading to a declining path of access prices, con-
trary to the ladder of investment.
The case for intermediate regulation
We now present simple arguments for the relation-
ships between bottleneck access prices and (a) in-
cumbent’s bottleneck investments, (b) entrants’ bot-
tleneck bypass investments and (c) entrants’ in-
vestments upstream/downstream of the bottleneck.
Consider first the relationship between the regulat-
ed (bottleneck) price and the incumbent’s infra-
structure investment, as depicted in Figure 1. The
simplified view illustrated by the investment func-
tion (correspondence) combines two constraints on
investment. The first constraint is that the firm will
only invest if it expects to cover its costs. Thus, the
regulated price has to exceed average costs, as per-
ceived by the firm (and by its sources of finance).
The second constraint arises due to the quantity
demanded at the regulated price. Under certainty
about costs the investment will equal the demanded
quantity at regulated prices between pTight and
pMonopoly. Above pMonopoly the investment would stay
constant because the regulatory price constraint
would no longer be binding. Under uncertainty of
the regulator (and possibly the regulated firm) about
costs there would be a range of prices, at which the
firm would only invest with some probability. As-
sume,for example,that average costs (AC) are even-
ly distributed between ACminand ACmax.In this case,
the regulator can only be sure of the investment at
price p = ACmax. Weighted by its probability the
expected amount of investment will therefore in-
crease within some range between p = ACmin and p =
ACmax and decline thereafter (until pMonopoly).4 
Assuming that the regulated firm takes the regulated
price as given, the supply function for investment in
Figure 1 will be affected by cost and demand risks. In
particular, the risk results in a thick corridor in the
horizontal portion.This leads to asymmetric effects of
tight vs. soft regulation. Tight regulation can po-
tentially lead to high investment, due to the implied
large demanded quantity. However, it could also lead
to zero investment if the regulated firm (or the capi-
tal market) views the investment as being too risky at
that price. In contrast, a price increase to the level of
soft regulation implies no regulatory risk (under full
commitment), but leads (most certainly) to a fairly
small investment. Intermediate regulation leads to
substantially higher investment that can also be virtu-
ally assured.The view exposed in this argumentation
contrasts with most of the literature, which largely
neglects any demand-side effects from lower prices.
The regulatory restructuring is based on the premise
that regulation can assist new technical and market
developments in abolishing or reducing bottlenecks
over time. Figure 2 provides a stylized supply func-
tion for the bypass investments of entrants as a func-
tion of the bottleneck access price. The function is
mainly driven by the relationship between the bot-
tleneck access price and the costs of bypass repre-
sented by the range of bold horizontal lines. If the
access price is below the cost range there is going to
be little or no bypass. Bypass will increase with in-
creasing access prices within the range of bypass
costs because bypass becomes cheaper relative to
the alternative of bottleneck ac-
cess.5This happens even if bottle-
A simplified view of the incumbent's bottleneckinvestment as a funcionof price:
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AS IMPLIFIED VIEW OF THE INCUMBENT’S BOTTLENECK INVESTMENT
AS A FUNCTION OF PRICE: SOFT VS. TIGHT REGULATION 4 Depending on the regulator’s risk aver-
sion it now becomes optimal for the regu-
lator to choose a regulated price that a-
ssures investment with a high probability.
If the regulator is not risk-averse and maxi-
mizes expected consumer surplus E(V(p))
for cost distribution F(AC) with density
f(AC), then dE(V)/dp = f(p)V(p) – F(p)
q(p), implying a f.o.c. f(p)/F(p) = q(p)/V(p).
5 In contrast, Sappington (2005) argues
that tight regulation is accompanied by
aggressive downstream competition,while
soft regulation would be accompanied by
more collusive behaviour. As a result, in
Sappington’s model the alternative com-
petitors will only invest in bottleneck by-
pass if they can do so more cheaply than
the incumbent and that will be indepen-
dent of the regulated bottleneck access
charge. Mandy (2009), however, finds that
input prices generally matter for the effi-
cient make-or-buy decision.neck access is slightly cheaper. Bypass provides the
entrants with more and better quality options and
more independence (however,more risks as well).Al-
though the bottleneck access alternative becomes
even less attractive at higher access prices, the
entrants may have a hard time fully bypassing the
incumbent’s bottleneck and therefore bypass may
decline with further access charge increases.
The next type of infrastructure concerns investments
downstream or upstream of the bottleneck and is
generally not regulated. In Figure 3 we are consider-
ing only the alternative competitors’ infrastructure
which by assumption is no bottleneck.6At low access
prices entrants will have low overall costs and
expand, leading to high upstream/downstream in-
vestments. At high access prices overall costs of en-
trants will be higher in absolute
terms and relative to those of the
incumbent. In spite of some by-
pass, entrants will lose market
share and the total market quan-
tity will be lower.
Implementation issues
With the exception of entrants’ up-
stream/downstream investments,
intermediate or even soft regula-
tion is likely to provide better in-
vestment incentives than tight regu-
lation. Incentive regulation, how-
ever, seems to call for a tight ap-
proach.How then can soft/interme-
diate regulation provide efficiency
incentives? 
Assuming that firms maximize
profits and therefore fully respond
to incentives instead of incurring
X-inefficiency there should be no
tension between intermediate/soft
regulation and strong productivity
incentives. For example, soft price-
cap regulation means a higher cap
than under tight regulation.Gener-
ally,the cost-reducing incentives are
deemed largely independent of the
price-cap level so that incentives
would be preserved.In contrast,in-
vestment incentives would be increased.
However, how can intermediate regulation be im-
plemented? Criteria for tight regulation are usually
quite precise and can be framed in regulatory rules/
laws. In contrast, soft/intermediate regulation may
require regulatory discretion.7 Verifiable criteria for
“intermediate” are hard to come by.
As an example of intermediate regulation the German
Telecommunications Act of 2003 contains a com-
bination of ex post regulation and the application of
competition law criteria. This approach gives the
incumbent some flexibility because he/she does not
have to get permission first before setting prices.At the
same time, the criterion for regulatory intervention is
not based on efficient costs (which are the criterion for
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Figure 2
A simplified view of the entrants'bypass investment as a functionof bottleneck access price:
Soft vs. tight regulation
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AS IMPLIFIED VIEW OF THE ENTRANTS’B YPASS INVESTMENT AS A
FUNCTION OF BOTTLENECK ACCESS PRICE: SOFT VS. TIGHT REGULATION
Figure 3
A simplified view of the entrants' upstream/downstream investment as a function of bottleneck access price:
Soft vs. tight regulation
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AS IMPLIFIED VIEW OF THE ENTRANTS’U PSTREAM/DOWNSTREAM
INVESTMENT AS A FUNCTION OF BOTTLENECK ACCESS PRICE: 
SOFT VS. TIGHT REGULATION
6 We leave out upstream/downstream investments of incumbents. 7 The commitment problem is treated below.CESifo DICE Report 3/2010 17
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ex ante regulation in the same law) but rather on non-
abusive prices.8 A second proposal consists of a more
explicit modeling of cost uncertainty for purposes of
determining regulated prices. This includes the inclu-
sion of real options but goes beyond by establishing
cost ranges rather than just point estimates. Regulated
prices could then be characterized as tight at the
expected value of costs, as intermediate at one stan-
dard deviation above and as soft at two standard devi-
ations above expected cost levels.9 Benchmarking reg-
ulation based on averages rather than on frontier costs
would be another example for intermediate regulation.
This would be a pricing approach where clear differen-
tiation of criteria is possible.
My reading from the empirical and theoretical litera-
ture is that, initially, the move from rate-of-return
regulation to incentive regulation or from state-
owned (“unregulated”) to privatized incentive-regu-
lated enterprises has involved quite soft regulation.
This happened both because of inexperience and
cautiousness of the regulators, who are afraid of ser-
vice interruptions,and because of large potentials for
efficiency improvements. After some time, this cau-
tiousness and potential productivity improvements
diminished and regulation became tighter. That may
be the reason why Greenstein et al. (1995) and Ai
and Sappington (2002) found positive relationships
between the introduction of incentive regulation and
investment. It may also be the reason why incum-
bents today complain about the lack of investment
incentives. Cambini and Rondi (2010) estimate that
softer incentive regulation (with lower x-factor and
higher WACC) leads to higher investment. All this
would suggest a return to “softer” regulation.
The issue of regulatory commitment
Regulatory commitment or the lack thereof is one of
the most important features shaping the relationship
between regulation and investment.One of the most
interesting results in the new empirical literature on
regulation and investment is therefore the finding by
Grajek and Röller (2009) that regulators respond to
increased infrastructure investments on the part of
incumbents by tightening regulation. Anticipating
this regulatory response, the incumbents will reduce
investments from the very beginning.
How is the above discussion of the tightness of regula-
tion affected by the issue of regulatory commitment?
First, regulation that is too soft is likely to lead to
excess profits over time. Because such profits tend to
be unacceptable to the public and hence to regulators,
they shorten the commitment period. Second, con-
versely, regulation that is too tight is likely to lead to
losses over time.Losses are also unacceptable to regu-
lators and therefore also shorten the commitment
period. In contrast to both, intermediate regulation
will less likely lead to either excessive profits or exces-
sive losses and will therefore more likely be viable for
longer periods than either soft or tight regulation. As
a consequence, intermediate regulation enhances the
commitment power and investment incentives.
As argued in Vogelsang (2010) the infeasibility of
unlimited commitment requires a restriction of in-
centive regulation to time spans of 3–5 years.10 Re-
gulation then would have to be revisited under non-
incentive criteria, such as rate-of-return regulation.
This could be augmented by a used-and-useful crite-
rion for including assets in the rate base. This may
counter any Averch-Johnson type overcapitalization
tendencies.According to Gilbert and Newbery (1994),
it provides for an efficient approach to investing. At
the same time, in the US, rate-of-return regulation
represents a credible commitment because of Supreme
Court decisions (in particular, the “Hope” decision of
194411). Although the used-and-useful criterion has
been subject to extensive court review there, it may
introduce new regulatory uncertainties that could
reduce investment incentives and increase the cost
of capital (Baumol and Sidak 2002).
While at first blush this suggestion appears to be tai-
lor-made for the US only, it has to be kept in mind
that current updates of price-cap regulation outside
the US also rely heavily on rate-of-return criteria (in
the form of actual and permissible WACC).
Conclusions
There are two main regulatory concerns for invest-
ment in network industries.They are uncertainty and
the lack of regulatory commitment over a long time
horizon associated with investment. Both these con-
cerns favor intermediate regulation. In addition, the
8 Non-abusive prices include normal (workably-competitive)
markups on the firm’s actual costs (rather than prices equal effi-
cient costs).
9 Based on an error analysis, according to which the error of no
investment weighs heavier than the error of too high prices.
10 This time span may also be sufficient for spurring productivity-
increasing investments that do not increase capacity.
11 U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Power Commission v. HopeNatural
Gas Co., 32D U.S. 591 (1944).commitment issue favors a regulatory review cycle
with true-ups based on actual costs and rate-of-re-
turn criteria.
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